What\u27s Wrong with the Law? by Webster, Bethuel Matthew, Jr.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 4 Article 3 
August 2021 
What's Wrong with the Law? 
Bethuel Matthew Webster Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Bethuel Matthew Webster, Jr., What's Wrong with the Law?, 5 Denv. B.A. Rec. 5 (1928). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
land floods had aroused congressional in the Washington delegation would
interest in flood legislation and that be a unit in demanding congressional
this sentiment would assist in the pas- legislation predicated on a six state
sage of one of the Colorado River Bills. basis if a seven state basis cannot be
Mr. Bannister hoped that the people secured. -A. J. G.
What's Wrong With The Law?
Long-tailed Coats, Green Bags, Stuffy Pomposity Have Been
Laughed Away, but Legal Machinery Intended for Rural
Communities Creaks Badly Today-Juries and Judges,
Laymen and Lawyers Must Act Now to Bring
Justice Back to the Courts.
By BETH1UEL MATTHEW WEBSTER. J.
Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
Son of B. M. Webster of The Denver Bar
ECURITY of commercial trans-
actions, peace of mind, happi-
ness, and health-these depend
upon efficient administration of jus-
tice. Yet the profession of law is in
disrepute. Judicial machinery has
broken down. Courts are despised and
avoided. Most unfortunate of all, due
mainly to shameful neglect, there is
chronic, terrible failure of criminal
justice.
Well, what can be done about it?
Laymen and lawyers have a joint re-
sponsibility. In taking remedial steps
the bar must be provoked by an indig-
nant, dissatisfied public. But that pub-
lic must be enlightened. Failure of
justice is not an occult occurrence. It
is usually attributable to obvious, con-
crete flaws in the judicial machinery-
an outworn part, an over-loaded en-
gine, insufficient fuel. To lend intelli-
gent assistance in correcting the im-
perfections, conscientious laymen must
understand the operation of the jury
system. They must scrutinize profes-
sional poses. They must determine
whether the old machinery is adequate
for present use.
The friction incidental to the opera-
tion of the jury system is a condition
with which most laymen are familiar.
One who has talked to many jurors, in
and out of court, can say with assur-
ance that the average private citizen
is appalled and frightened into inac-
tivity by the complicated business of
the administration of justice. A feel-
ing of the futility of individual effort is
the bane of large-scale democracy. The
consequence of this feeling-inactivity
-is interpreted as apathy, self-inter-
est, ignorance. It is not that.
The writer has seen few jurors who
failed to take an active interest in a
case on trial before them. Not infre-
quently, after trial, a juror calls on
one of the attorneys to explain his ac-
tion in a case. If, in a criminal case
there has been a disagreement, the
juror often makes suggestions respect-
ing presentation of the case for retrial
to the lawyers representing the side
he favors, and not infrequently jurors
apologize for the action of their fel-
lows.
In spite of judicial admonition, jur-
ors discuss cases with their relatives
and business associates during re-
cesses. They linger to ask questions
after trial. The moral standards of a
race, a generation or a community can
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be learned from jurors after a crim-
inal prosecution. The business ethics,
the prejudices, the varied experiences
of the rank and file can be determined
by talking to persons who have served
as jurors in a civil action.
Yet there are shocking miscarriages
of theoretical justice. Juries in crim-
inal cases commonly exercise their an-
cient prerogative of lawlessness. In
the face of overwhelmingly convincing
evidence they acquit defendants for
reasons having no relation to the is-
sues before them. In Colorado there
is a story of a drought-stricken farmer
jury that refused to convict because of
the -expense to the county in sending
the prisoner to the state penitentiary
in the custody of the sheriff.
Unethical reference to facts outside
the competent evidence often results
in disagreement or acquittal. Sum-
mation by counsel is supposed to be
restricted to fair comment on the evi-
dence; nevertheless, the jury in the
first trial of Harry Daugherty and
Thomas Miller for conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States out of their
honest services as public officials was
led by counsel to believe that the ex-
Attorney General destroyed material
evidence in the form of bank records
to preserve the memory of a dead
President, a matter in respect to which
there was not a shred of testimony.
Behind the seemingly willful and
capricious actions of jurors there are
causes which cannot be isolated by
analysis or eliminated by exhortation.
One's action is determined by his en-
dowment and his experience. It is now
a notorious fact that it is practically
impossible to convict a man of fraud
in connection with the administration
of public office. The armor of great-
ness is awe-inspiring, impenetrable,
and, once sealed, is worn to the grave.
Jurors who have paid petty fees for
"protection" seldom convict for bri-
bery, however flagrant the case may
be. Prosperous persons, such as mer-
chants, bankers, manufacturers, are
always challenged by the defendant's
lawyers when the jurors are being
chosen in commercial fraud cases.
They are too cold, too exacting, too
anxious to convict, especially if the ac-
cused is a small tradesman. And fool-
ish is the district attorney who fails to
account for the racial factor in select-
ing his jury and presenting his case.
Yet in some instances jurors are
righteously indignant. A postal thief
has little hope in any court. Most
bank defaulters, on advice of counsel,
plead guilty before trial. Narcotic
peddlers are rarely acquitted.
Legislation enacted without regard
for men's prejudices and the jury sys-
tem can never be fully enforced.
Take the Mann act. Unless a child
has been deceived or debauched, the
law prohibiting interstate traffic in
women is seldom the basis of prosecu-
tion, though it is commonly -known
that violations of the letter of the law
are wholesale. Apart from evidence
of shocking depravity, the obscenity
sections of the Federal criminal code
are largely eniforced through civil or
administrative action. Tax fraud
cases, in the absence of special cir-
cumstances, are settled out of court.
Unless there is an element of bri-
bery or perjury, in respect to which
,the community at large has a strong
feeling, prosecutions under the pro-
hibition act are rarely successful.
Jurors may disregard law and rea-
son in reaching or in refusing to reach
a verdict. They are endowed with
that power by such phrases as "rea-
sonable doubt" and "preponderance of
evidence". Vague judicial definitions
of these terms leave openings through
which the individual juror is able to
drive his prejudices.
A prosecution under criminal pro-
visions of the bankruptcy act vividly
illustrates this point. A small trades-
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man going into bankruptcy must ac-
count to his trustee for every remain-
ing asset of the enterprise. Though in
theory he is not to be penalized for
business failure, he must turn over to
his creditors all property not legiti-
mately disposed of in the course of
business. Yet unless there is evidence
of crude and brazen theft, such as re-
moving merchandise or deliberately
falsifying books of account, one who
has concealed assets may confidently
expect acquittal. The defendant is
pitied and exonerated. A precept re-
quiring good faith to a superlative ex-
tent is out of harmony with the mores
and the business practices of the time.
One who attends court as juror or
spectator cannot avoid noting that the
Pickwickian deference anciently asso-
ciated with trial practice is no longer
displayed by bench or bar. The de-
fendant gets a run for his money-a
full day in court and an unrestrained
lawyer. All concerned recognize that
admonitions from the court may be
utilized in a defendant's favor; reproof
is often sought for what it is worth. A
sporting jury will not convict if the
court too closely limits a defender.
A prosecuting attorney may not in-
terrupt to object before an improper
question has been asked, hence the
jury swallows the question before it
has been ruled indigestible. For ex-
ample, in a case tried by the writer,
a doctor was called as a character wit-
ness. Before objection could be made
and sustained it was proved to the
satisfaction of the jury that the ac-
cused was suffering from heart dis-
ease. A subsequent direction by the
court to disregard such testimony was
utterly ineffectual. The defendant was
found not guilty.
In the form of an attack on the
credibility of a witness, a skillful
cross-examiner is able to inject the
most insidiously irrelevant, immaterial
matter into the stenographic record.
Though it is ruled improper, the un-
answered question may plant the seed
of "reasonable doubt". Intellectual
dishonesty is manifested by confusion
of issues, yet the reputation of the
most successful trial practitioners
rests on condonation of the practice.
The lawyer-client relationship is no
longer self-consciously and hypocriti-
cally veiled. Realizing there is noth-
ing essentially noble in any commer-
cial relationship, bar associations
frankly constitute committees to de-
cide actual questions of professional
ethics. The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York has a depart-
ment for registration of grievances
and the institution of disbarment pro-
ceedings. So-called character com-
mittees, passing on applications for
admission to practice, realistically em-
phasize educational fitness to the ex-
clusion of other considerations.
Though they chat of character, they
sensibly refrain from weighing im-
ponderables.
There was a time when jokes at the
expense of the legal profession pro-
voked snickers in any circle. Lawyers
met a sally with embarrassment and
assumption of dignity; they hastened
to explain the tender priest-and-peni-
tent-like relation between solicitor and
client; they compared themselves to
the doctor at the bedside of a sick
patient.
In America this pose was associated
with the long-tailed coat, the green
bag, the assumption of dignity and
learning, and it lingered as a charac-
teristiF of the bar long after the pro-
fession ceased to be trustee of learning
power and public confidence.
The bar failed to see that the legal
joke was evidence of smoldering dis-
trust. Lawyers did not become more
humble as learning became more dif-
fuse, with the result that the law be-
came a hide-bound, reactionary science
at a time when professional resource-
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fulness was the most essential quality.
It has taken a generation to remove a
meretricious sensitiveness.
Laymen cannot be expected to un-
derstand or correct the basic dogmas
of criminal jurisprudence. Scientists
and lawyers differ as to their validity
and application. Apart from the plain
maladministration of legal precepts
and current notions, a condition the
layman is quick to indicate, the doc-
trines of criminal law are being scru-
tinized by scientists in search for the
basic causes of friction. Well equip-
ped agencies have begun to collect
data from which useful generalizations
may be expected.
Comprehensive surveys of criminal
justice in Cleveland and Chicago, the
work of the Judge Baker Foundation
in the field of juvenile delinquency,
the research which the Harvard Law
School is now seeking funds to under-
take and the publication of numerous
books treating particular phases of
crime and criminal responsibility are
examples of this fruitful process.
The old machinery, the old attitudes,
the old dogmas-all have been stretch-
ed and strained by unprecedented so-
cial changes, and only recently, after
twenty years of distrust, has the pro-
fession frankly asserted the need for
fundamental alterations.
In making structural changes it is
necessary to keep in mind the history
of the reception and development of
English law in America. Colonists,
distrusting all British institutions,
were reluctant to receive the aristo-
cratic traditions and practices of the
common law. They looked with dis-
favor on the practice of appointing
judges not responsive to popular will;
they hesitated to yield any of the
functions for which they fought.
Judges learned in the law were not
required in some localities, and in at
least one instance citation of English
authorities was forbidden by statute.
Colonial feeling was crystallized in
constitutions and laws established a
short-term, elective bench of limited
authority.
The vigorous, self-sufficient popula-
tion of mining camps and primitive
farming communities was satisfied
with a state of justice without law.
They settled their own affairs with
dispatch and satisfaction, and, inci-
dentally, established customs which
were later absorbed into the body of
the law. People who could develop a
system of mining and water rights
without serious judicial interference
had reason to be self-confident. It is
not strange they favored elective
judges with limited powers and low
salaries.
The American system of court or-
ganization was devised to carry jus-
tice to a scattered rural population,
and few special facilities were provid-
ed for sections in which population
has since massed.
No one, however far-sighted, could
have gauged the wear and tear to
which courts thus constituted would
be subjected. To the neglect of judi-
cial organization, state legislatures
have been absorbed in the task of en-
acting legislation required by the eco-
nomic interests of a growing, pros-
perous country.
Constitutional amendments and bills
providing long tenure of office, large
discretion and adequate salaries-in-
dispensable prerequisites of a compe-
tent, self-respecting judiciary-have
only recently evoked popular approval.
In addition to major complaints,
there are many petty causes for failure
in administration of criminal justice.
One of the most irritating of these is
the manner of calling cases for plead-
ing and trial in busy overloaded tri-
bunals.
The court to which the writer is at-
tached, a District Court of the United
States, is perhaps less objectionable
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than many state and city courts in this
respect, yet on calendar days it is a
madhouse. While prisoners in cus-
tody are pulled back and forth through
a milling crowd of hangers-on, "chisel-
lers", they are called, deputy marshals
shout for silence, the clerk calls the
jury list, the court bellows-and meas-
ures justice.
This is as undignified and demoral-
izing as it is unnecessary. It subjects
a learned court to embarrassment and
fatigue. It degrades the bar and the
accused. The writer has been in petty
criminal courts in London, Berlin, and
outlying American cities, where there
is no such turmoil as that to which
residents of Chicago and New York
have become accustomed.
Disorder and crude practice may be
traced to the quarters in which a court
is lodged. The want of efficiency and
decorum seen in the New York court-
house illustrates the demoralizing ef-
fect of architecturally monstrous sur-
roundings on the administration of
justice.
New York County has experienced
success in the employment of ade-
quately compensated, more or less per-
manently employed prosecutors. Far-
reaching benefits would flow from
adoption of the same policy in Federal
and state courts.
Generally speaking, members of the
government's legal department have
little of the fine sense of responsibility
for excellent performance that actu-
ates the staff of a first rate private
firm. A $2,000 man can set wheels in
motion which will cost the govern-
ment many thousands of dollars. His
lack of care or judgment is likely to
cause the ruin of an innocent man.
Reformers despising the low-grade
criminal bar suggest that reputable,
high-class lawyers gratuitously devote
a portion of their time to criminal
cases. Such a scheme is impractic-
able.
In the first place, reputable, high-
class lawyers could not obtain crim-
inal clients. A criminal wants results
and he doesn't care how they are se-
cured.
He wants a lawyer who knows the
ropes; he seeks a man favorably
known to the district attorney and the
court. It stands to reason he has no
use for a condescending practitioner
who is sensitive to petty sharp prac-
tice. Moreover, -a criminal wants an
attorney who can listen sympathetic-
ally to a candid story, a man who is
equally efficient in securing bail bonds-
men and adjournments.
The available remedy is neither
Utopian nor complete. Two things can
be done. Perfection of the mechanics
of criminal practice will preclude in-
numerable potential abuses. Rigid bar
association scrutiny will eliminate out-
rageously improper practices.
Public insistence on an overhauling
of the entire structure, with allotment
of salaries and officials commensurate
with the business to be done, combined
with facilities for the speedy and dig-
nified disposition of criminal cases,
will do much to dispel the current pro-
fessional revulsion from criminal prac-
tice and help to restore public faith in
bench and bar. A realistic, functional
study of the administration of crim-
inal justice, instead of the adoption of
patronizing resolutions, is an immed-
iate activity to which lawyers and leg-
islators can devote themselves with a
degree of hope. The present advant-
age of such action will be a more
satisfactory application of existing
law. And the stage will be set for
the timely reception of new doctrine.
Benjamin Franklin
"Of him may be said, perhaps, with
as much propriety as of any other
man, that he never said a word too
soon, nor a word too late, nor a word
too much."-John Bigelow.
